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In a recent paper,1 we have discussed the
consequences in EU law of US legislation2
requiring airline companies to transfer and give
access to US authorities to passengers’ data. Such
consequences have been analyzed vis-à-vis the
right to privacy and personal data protection from
a European point of view. We have also analyzed
what would be the proper European legal basis to
decide on this issue, and we have studied the
documents exchanged between EU and US
authorities taking into account the principles that
should be respected to reach an “adequate level of
protection”. This update considers the recent
adequacy Decision on the subject from the
Commission and other developments in the
ongoing discussions across the Atlantic.
A. Introduction
The European Commission has recently adopted
an adequacy Decision for the transfer of passenger
name record (PNR) data to the US.3 The
application of this instrument is not automatic:
[t]he Decision will enter into force once the
US has signed its undertakings and once the
international agreement that will complement
the adequacy Decision has been signed by the
Council and the US.4
In this paper we will consider the related
developments in this arena in five directions: (1)
the new Undertakings of the Department of
Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP); (2) the actions taken by
the European Commission;  (3) the reaction by the
European Parliament in this regard; (4) a recent
Opinion of the Article 29 Personal Data
Protection Working Party; and (5) an Opinion of
the Belgian Data Protection Authority (DPA)
concerning a case submitted to it. We will refer,
very briefly, to some of the controversial issues
(“fondo” and “forma”) that are still unresolved. It
may be that a final word has still to be stated
from the European Court of Justice,5 so this
article is simply a follow-up of the recent EU-US
dialogue news.
B. Recent developments
As a consequence of the conflict between US
requirements and EU Data Protection legislation, a
series of negotiations started between both parties in
order to reach a solution. A balance between the two
different legitimate political interests at stake (the
fight against terrorism and the protection to
fundamental rights) was required. From a European
perspective, the parameters to make a legitimate
balance are to be found in Article 8.2 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Freedom,6 the related case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights, as well as in
Article 13 of the Personal Data Protection Directive.7
1. New CBP undertakings
The early Undertakings8 issued by the CBP
authorities have been criticized by the Article 29
Personal Data Protection Working Party9 for not
qualifying for an “adequate level of protection”.
Moreover, an “Adequacy” decision was not
deemed to be sufficient as such to regulate the
“transfer” and “access” to personal data, as
required by the US legislation. This derived in the
consideration of other legal basis10 to settle that
insufficiency.
The new Undertakings11 are the result of the
negotiation process between the European
Commission and the CBP, and they address, in
principle, the principles of content and
enforcement that should be respected for an
adequacy declaration.12
Basically, the new Undertakings (that consist of
48 points) address the principles as follows:
 Purpose limitation: in Point (3), under the title
“Use of PNR Data by CBP”, it is declared that:
“PNR data is issued by CBP strictly for purposes
of preventing and combating: 1) terrorism and
related crimes; 2) other serious crimes, including
organized crime, that are transnational in
nature; and 3) flight from warrants or custody
for the crimes described above”.
 Notwithstanding this clear definition of the
purposes it has to be noted that points (34)
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and (35) of the Undertakings, under the title
“Transfer of PNR Data to Other Government
Authorities”, widen the purposes as follows:
(34) “No statement herein shall impede the use
or disclosure of PNR data to relevant
government authorities, where such disclosure
is necessary for the protection of the vital
interests of the data subject or of other
persons, in particular as regards significant
health risks. Disclosures for these purposes
will be subject to the same conditions for
transfers set forth in paragraphs 31 and 32 - of
these Undertakings”; and (35) “No statement
in these Undertakings shall impede the use or
disclosure of PNR data in any criminal
judicial proceedings or as otherwise required
by law.(…)”.
 Data quality and proportionality: the initial
requested 38 PNR items have been reduced to
34 items. In what concerns time limit, there are
different periods foreseen. PNR will be kept by
CBP during three and a half years. In case the
data have been manually accessed, the
retention period will be of eight years.
 Transparency:  Point (36)  stated that: “CBP
will provide information to the travelling
public regarding the PNR requirement and the
issues associated with its use (i.e., general
information regarding the authority under
which the data is collected, the purpose for the
collection, protection of the data, data
sharing, the identity of the responsible official,
procedures available for redress and contact
information for persons with questions or
concerns, etc., for posting on CBP’s website, in
travel pamphlets, etc.)”.
 Security: the measures to be adopted are
described in Points (16) to (23) and comprise,
among others, the use of a CBP intranet
system which is encrypted end-to-end for CBP
personnel to have access to PNR; a read-only
data base; the fact that no foreign, federal,
state or local agency has direct electronic
access to PNR data through CBP databases;
the fact that only certain CBP officers,
employees or information technology
contractors have an active, password-protected
account in the CBP computer system, and have
a recognized official purpose for reviewing
PNR data, may access PNR data; etc.
 Right of access and rectification: Point (37)
determines: “Requests by the data subject (also
known as “first party requesters”) to receive a
copy of PNR data contained in CBP databases
regarding the data subject are processed under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
(…)”.Then, Point (39) says: “CBP will undertake
to rectify data at the request of passengers and
crewmembers, air carriers or Data Protection
Authorities (DPAs) in the EU Member States (to
the extent specifically authorized by the data
subject), where CBP determines that such data is
contained in its database and a correction is
justified and properly supported. CBP will
inform any Designated Authority which has
received such PNR data of any material
rectification of that PNR data”.
 Onward transfers: Points (28) to (35) declare
what would be the policy on “Transfer of PNR
Data to Other Government Authorities”. Point
(29) regulates: “CBP, in its discretion, will only
provide PNR data to other government
authorities with counter-terrorism or law
enforcement functions, on a case-by-case basis,
for purposes of preventing and combating
offences identified in paragraph 3 herein.
(Authorities with whom CBP may share such
data shall hereinafter be referred to as the
‘Designated Authorities’)”.
 Sensitive data: CBP claims that it “will not use
‘sensitive data’ (..) from PNR (…)”.
 Enforcement mechanisms: Point (41) asserts:
“In the event that a Data subject’s complaint
cannot be resolved by CBP, the complaint
may be directed, in writing, to the Chief
Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC 20528, who will
review the situation and endeavour to resolve
the complaint”. Point (42) stipulates:
“Additionally, the DHS Privacy Office will
address on an expedited basis complaints
referred to it by DPAs in the European Union
(EU) Member States on behalf of an EU
resident to the extent such resident has
authorized the DPA to act on his or her
behalf and believes that his or her data
protection complaint regarding PNR has not
been satisfactorily dealt with by CBP (as set
out in paragraphs 37-41 of these
Undertakings) or the DHS Privacy Office.
The Privacy Office will report its conclusions
and advise the DPA or DPAs concerned
regarding actions taken, if any. The DHS
Chief Privacy Officer will include in her
report to Congress issues regarding the
number, the substance and the resolution of
complaints regarding the handling of
personal data, such as PNR”.
Public security versus data privacy
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Some other controversial issues have been added
to the document:
 CAPPS II:13 the new Undertakings state that
CBP may transfer PNRs on a bulk basis to the
Transportation Security Administration for
“testing” CAPPS II.
 Reciprocity: in case the EU decides to adopt an
analogue system for passengers’ data “CBP
would encourage US-based airlines to
cooperate”.
 No private right or precedent created: Point
(47) states that “These Undertakings do not
create or confer any right or benefit on any
person or party, private or public”.
2. European Commission action
On the basis of these new Undertakings the
Commission drafted a Decision on the adequate
protection of personal data contained in the PNR
of air passengers transferred to the United States’
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
This Decision declares the “adequacy” of the
new Undertakings in order to permit the transfer
of this data to the US by the airline companies.
The legal basis of this Decision is Article 25.6 of
Directive 95/46/EC, being this Article an exception
to the general principle of Article 25.1 that
prohibits the transfer of personal data to countries
not assuring an “adequate level of protection”.
At the same time, the Commission has also
presented a Proposal for a Council Decision on the
conclusion of an Agreement between the European
Community and the USA on the processing and
transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United
States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection.14
The legal basis of this proposal is Article
300(2) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community. The reasons to adopt such an
Agreement are mainly twofold: (1) Direct access by
US authorities to PNR databases located in Europe
involves the exercise of US sovereignty in EU
territory, what needs an explicit consent by EU; (2)
Article 7 of the Directive 95/46/EC enunciates
restrictively a list of circumstances under which
personal data can be processed, and for the time
being  no legal obligation for air carriers  to
process PNR data with the purpose of given access
and transfer it to the US does exist according to
this provision.15
So, the proposed Agreement declares that CBP
may electronically access the PNR data from air
carriers’ reservation systems located within the
territory of the Member States of the EC in
accordance with the Decision and until a
satisfactory transmission system is put in place.
Furthermore, this instrument would create the
obligation for air carriers to process PNR data as
required by CBP pursuant to US law. Indeed, this
legal obligation is supposed to be created in order
to legitimize such a processing under Article 7(c)
of Directive 95/46/EC.
3. Reaction of the European
Parliament
The European Parliament has reacted to the
Commission initiatives expressing its disagreement.16
Regarding the adequacy Decision (when it still was in
its draft status), the Parliament called upon the
Commission to withdraw it. As far as the Proposal
for an Agreement was concerned, it did not approve
of the conclusion in the Agreement, instructing its
President to call on the Council not to conclude the
Agreement. It also called on the Council to refrain
from complicating the Agreement until the Court of
Justice delivered its opinion on its compatibility with
the Treaty under Article 300(6) of the EC Treaty.
The Agreement is referred to by the majority
of the European Parliament as a “light
international agreement” because the Parliament
was only consulted about it. However, its opinion
is not binding. The Parliament is concerned as to
the nature, from a constitutional perspective, of
the instrument chosen by the European
Commission to limit a fundamental right, which
may not be the appropriate action.
The (draft) Adequacy Decision, on the other
hand, was criticized by the European Parliament for
different reasons, eg, for being based on
Undertakings that were of purely administrative
nature and which content should be improved (e.g., a
list of serious crimes in respect of which additional
request could be made, the list of authorities and
agencies which could access or obtain the PNR data
collected by the CBP and the data protection
conditions to be respected by these third parties,
etc.).
4. The Opinion issued by the Article
29 Personal Data Protection Working
Party
The Working Party has issued three Opinions since
the negotiations with CBP started. The last one is
referred to the new Undertakings (as attached to
the draft Commission Decision). The Working
Party welcomed the “sunset clause” in Point (46),
The Parliament is
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under which the undertakings shall apply for a
term of three years and a half, and before
extending them further discussions should take
place. It also welcomed the joint reviews foreseen
in Point (43). This audit procedure would be
carried out once a year by CBP in conjunction with
DHS, and the European Commission, assisted as
appropriate by representatives of European law
enforcement authorities and/or authorities of the
Member States of the European Union.
Nevertheless, the Opinion pointed out several
issues that still need to be improved in order to
achieve a legitimate framework for the transfer of
PNR data. In particular, and among other
problems, the Working Party considered that: (1)
given the fact that CAPPS II raised particular
issues that needs to be clarified, US authorities
should refrain from using PNR data for
implementing or testing CAPPS II; (2) the purpose
limitation principle, even if improved, still
presented certain vagueness, specially in what
concerns the expression “other serious crimes”; (3)
the list of PNR items, which has been reduced
from 38 to 34 items, was seen as a very little
progress; (4) the processing of sensitive data was
also still problematic, specially for what “free text
fields” may contain, which deletion should take
place in the EU, before the data was transferred;
(5) the data retention period, which indeed had
been reduced, was considered to remain
disproportionate; (6) a precise identification of the
other US public bodies entitled to receive the data
was required; (7) the access principle presented
some concerns, mainly regarding the exceptions
that may be opposed to the data subject in order
to refuse this right; etc.
At the time when the Working Party issued its
Opinion, it did not have access to the draft
Agreement. However, it commented that the right
to privacy could only be limited following the
conditions established by a legislative instrument
5. The Opinion of the Belgian Data
Protection Authority
The Belgian DPA has recently issued an Opinion17
after the complaint submitted by two citizens as a
consequence of the transmission of their personal
data (PNR and APIS) to the US by US airline
companies (Delta Airlines, United Airlines, and
Continental Airlines) in different trips that
departed from Belgium. The authority analysed
the applicable principles, and noted that the
purpose limitation principle, the information
principle, and the trans-border data flows (TBDF)
rules had not been respected by the carriers.
Concerning the purpose limitation principle, it
observed that passengers’ data were collected and
further processed for necessary contractual
obligations to carry out the transport of the
passenger. The transmission of these data to US
authorities went beyond this purpose.
Furthermore, the fact that the transmission
obligation was foreseen in US legislation did not
render it legally binding under EU law. It, thus,
could be considered as a legitimate basis for data
processing, at least until such obligation was
created under EU law.18
In respect of the legal obligation to inform the
data subject, the Belgian DPA verified that two of
the companies did not inform the passengers that
their data would be transferred to the US
authorities. One of the companies did inform, but
this information was considered minimal, taking
into account that it neither specified who would be
the addressee of it, nor its purpose. Moreover, the
means of communication was not explicit enough,
insofar the information was integrated into the
general conditions terms, which were available
upon request or via the Internet.
The last issue analysed was the compliance
with TBDF rules. The Opinion made reference to
the fact that, so far, the US had not been awarded
with an “adequacy” finding Decision issued by the
European Commission,19 not existing, in the
analysed case, any other legal basis for making the
transfer. This resulted in a transfer made illegally.
C. “Fondo” & “forma” issues
It is evident that there remain many controversial
issues to be clarified and ruled out in this intricate
and sensitive arena. Some of them deal with the
content of the negotiating instruments (“fondo”)
in order to respect not only “adequacy” principles,
but also other aspects that need to be further
discussed like the problem of EU sovereignty
already pointed out in the context of the Echelon
case.20 Others deal with the formalities and legal
basis to be used (“forma”) in order the reach a
constitutional respectful arrangement. We will
make a brief and not exhaustive reference to some
of those issues.
1. “Fondo”
Certain improvement to the classic “adequacy
principles” would still be desired, as pointed out
Public security versus data privacy
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by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party.
They will not be analysed again here, but let us
concentrate on other points that should be
considered in the very specific case of passengers’
data.
Specific concerns that remain regarding the use
of PNR and/or APIS data for CAPPS II should be
pointed out. Indeed, this system involves specific
risks for the protection of personal data which
have not been addressed by the Commission
Decision. No consideration has been given to the
fact that CAPPS II is actually a tool for automated
individual decisions, and respect should be given
provided to Article 15 of the Directive in the TBDF
context. It has to be underlined that it is also one
of the principles contained in the Working
Document n°12 elaborated by the Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party.21 In this context, even
for testing activities, “the individual should have
the right to know the logic involved in this
decision, and other measures should be taken to
safeguard the individual’s legitimate interest”.
Even if the official version of the Decision presents
certain few changes (compared to the draft
version) in Point (8) of the Undertakings regarding
the “purpose” of processing activities in the
current context of CAPPS II,22 respect for Article
15 is still missing.
The reciprocity issue is indeed outside the
scope of an “adequacy finding”, but from a Public
International law perspective is important as a sign
of bona fide and mutual commitments. However,
reciprocity seems not to be sufficiently guaranteed
in the new Undertakings. The soft compromise of
Point (45) waters down the seriousness of the
engagement being assumed. There is no
“reciprocity” indeed. A reciprocal engagement
would be one where US authorities assume the
compromise to impose such legal obligation as the
one the EU is seeking to impose within its territory
via the adoption of the proposed Agreement.
2. “Forma”
The situation concerning the legal basis is rather
complex too. The subject matter involves different
levels (or “pillars”) of EU law. This creates an
insufficiency of the traditional legal basis and
instruments used to solve the TBDF problematic.
Directive 95/46/EC is a first pillar Directive.
Adequacy Decisions have been adopted, so far,
mainly thinking about the free movement of data
for private bodies’ uses (the Safe Harbor could be
considered the paradigm of that logic). However,
in the passengers’ data case, the TBDF solution
has to guarantee the airline carriers that the
transfer made in this context is legal. Furthermore,
the TBDF solution has to guarantee a legitimate
transfer to public foreign bodies for the purpose of
the fight against terrorism and law enforcement.
This exceeds the material scope of the Directive.
This is, at EU level, a third pillar matter. Internally
speaking, the regulation of such an issue would
never be based on Article 95 TEC as is the
Directive 95/46/EC.23
Nevertheless, the concept of “adequate
protection” is, in our opinion, relevant for the
third pillar. The Additional Protocol to the
Convention n. 108 regarding supervisory
authorities and trans-border data flows,24 which is
applicable to the third pillar, explicitly regulates in
Article 2.1 that:
“1. Each Party shall provide for the transfer of
personal data to a recipient that is subject to the
jurisdiction of a State or organisation that is not
Party to the Convention only if that State or
organisation ensures an adequate level of
protection for the intended data transfer”
[emphasis added].
Other EU instruments of the third pillar also
foresee “adequate protection” for TBDF. For
instance, Article 18 of the Europol Convention
stipulates that:
“1. Europol may under the conditions laid
down in paragraph 4 communicate personal data
which it holds to third states and third bodies
within the meaning of Article 10(4), where: (…) 2)
an adequate level of data protection is ensured
in that State or that body, (…)”[emphasis added].
With this being said, even if the Working
Document n° 12 has been elaborated in the
context of Directive 95/46/EC, the principles
described therein, would, in principle, be respected
also in a third pillar framework. Perhaps, what
needs to be better defined is the legal basis for the
“Adequacy” finding referred in this paper.
Apart from that, there are other formal
requirements that have to be respected. Article 8.2
of the European Convention for the protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
requires that limitations to the right to privacy by
public authorities must be in accordance with the
law and necessary in a democratic society. In the
commented case, there remain doubts about the
pertinence of an adequacy Decision based on
unilateral Undertakings of the CBP and even of
No consideration
has been given to
the fact that






the proposed Agreement, from a constitutional
perspective. Strasbourg case law25 explains that
Article 8.2 requires the adoption of a “legislative
text” in the formal sense, meaning that the
intervention of the Legislative power ought to be
effective in the drafting and adoption process.
D. Concluding remarks
In fact, due to the present state of the passengers’
data debate, it is not yet possible to give a final
conclusion. This paper remains open to upcoming
actions to come at the EU level, and also,
potentially, at the national level as the Belgian case
shows. Word has been given to the European
Court of Justice, which is welcomed due to the
sensitivity of the issues at stake.
It is regrettable that personal data have been
transferred in violation of the law and without any
legal framework to regulate that anomalous
situation. Personal data transferred seems to be a
“no man’s land” story. However, “urgency” could
be also risky if a proper balance between
conflicting legitimate interests is not properly
respected in decision-making processes.
It would be interesting to see if the third pillar
implications are finally addressed. The airline
passengers’ case could be quite paradigmatic in
relation to the limits of the application of
Directive 95/46/EC to deal with TBDF made
beyond the first pillar of EU law.
Verónica Pérez Asinari Lawyer, Researcher at the
CRID and Yves Poullet, Dean of the Faculty of
Law, Director of the CRID. Professor at the
Universities of Namur and Liege Centre de
Recherches Informatique et Droit (CRID),
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